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During the late 1990s, Pakistan managed to significantly liberalize 
its external sector, and by 2002, the average tariff rate was under 
17 percent which was well below the average in comparative coun- 
tries. Using a social accounting matrix (SAM) for 2002, we develop 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to evaluate the im- 
pact of tariff reduction in Pakistan. Our analysis goes beyond the 
usual trade-focused general equilibrium studies for Pakistan, as we 
also conduct a detailed sensitivity analysis to check the robustness 
of welfare-related results. Our findings suggest an overall positive 
impact of slashing tariff rates on macroeconomic, and welfare in- 
dicators.
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I. Introduction
During late twentieth century, the developing countries started to 
embrace the process of globalization which included a reduction in 
trade barriers. The national markets started to get financially and oper- 
ationally integrated into the global markets. With increased technolo- 
gical innovation, firms were forced to adopt the new forms of econo- 
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mies of scale and the governments were forced to reduce their role in 
the (free) market system. Trade liberalization which initially started in 
the developed countries was reciprocal and multilateral. The later was 
based on the famously known most-favoured nation clause (see Davey 
and Pauwelyn 2000). Opening up the previously restricted trade regimes 
paved way for the global opportunities of exchange available for all 
countries. See Hillman (2003), Horn and Mavroidis (2001), and Ethier 
(2001, 2002). 
A. Rise and Fall of the Doha Development Agenda
An efficient and flexible trade policy intervention is known to help 
economies in smoothing the overall business cycles and external shocks.1 
In the recent past trade policy in most countries has revolved around 
the liberalization initiative. This involves: a) the reduction in import re- 
strictions such as tariffs and quotas, and b) reduction or elimination of 
subsidies that create distortions in the productive sectors of the econ- 
omy. Theoretically both these strands of trade liberalization are pro- 
efficiency (but not necessarily pro-poor). Countries need to embark simul- 
taneously on revamping the trade and domestic competition policies. The 
notion that free trade can actually generate efficiency will depend upon 
the promotion of competitiveness in all markets and a reduced govern- 
ment intervention in the form of minimum regulatory arrangements (see 
Tarjanne et al. 1995). 
Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995, international efforts towards a freer trade environment have in- 
creased. The inaugural ministerial conference in Singapore highlighted 
that the differences between the developed and developing economies 
fell under four main categories; investment protection, competition pol- 
icy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. These 
disagreements are also famously known as the Singapore Issues.2 Most 
of the WTO meetings except for the Doha round in 2001, could not 
achieve the desired agreement across countries and regional blocks. The 
Doha Development Round focused specifically on the lowering of trade 
1 This policy also interacts heavily with the exchange rate policy of a country 
where an overvalued currency can hurt its own exports and an undervalued 
currency can lead to an increased burden of debt and higher import cost in 
value terms. For applied methods in trade policy analysis, see Francois and 
Reinert (2008).
2 See Khor (2004) for a detailed description on the Singapore issues in the 
WTO: implications and recent developments. 
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barriers such as the import duties and licenses, quotas, tariffs, export, 
and production subsidies, export licenses and various non-tariff barriers.3 
The non-tariff barriers to trade commonly include antidumping and coun- 
tervailing duties. However, many rich countries also impose health and 
safety regulations and unconventional quality requirement standards 
(which are at times hard to meet particularly in the case of poor coun- 
tries). These barriers hurt efficiency as they run against the essence of 
comparative advantage literature.  
The Cancun meeting in 2003 was unsuccessful due to disagreements 
on issues related to the farm subsidies and access to markets.4 The 
main hindrances were the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy 
and the agro-subsidies to the farmers in the United States. In 2004, 
Geneva talks brought about an agreement where US, EU, Brazil, and 
Japan now showed readiness to end the export and agriculture-oriented 
subsidies and also reduce the tariff barriers. The developing countries 
were allowed to protect key industries while broadly lowering the tariffs 
on manufacturing sector imports. In the 6
th WTO ministerial conference 
held in Hong Kong a deadline was agreed upon for eliminating agri- 
cultural export subsidies by 2013. The next Geneva talks in 2006, 
however, collapsed with the EU blaming US for the failure as the 
demands put forward by the US in return for the reduction in farm 
subsidies proved to be unacceptable to the developing countries, even- 
tually leading to a suspension of the Doha negotiations.  
Several economists at the quantitative level have been interested in 
finding out the relationship between trade, growth, and welfare (see 
Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 2002). There is not much consensus on 
the causation, however the general understanding is that increased trade 
has the potential to promote growth and welfare (Cockburn et al. 2008). 
We intend to investigate this view in this paper. Section 2 focuses on 
trade policy linkages and the role of general equilibrium models. Section 
3 provides the experience of trade liberalization in Pakistan. Section 4 
describes the structure of our CGE model and its data. Finally, using 
this CGE model, we conduct policy experiments to look at the impact 
of tariff reduction at the same time complimenting this exercise with a 
detailed sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of parameters 
and closure rules.5   
3 See Page (2004) for principal issues in the Doha negotiations.
4 See Yallapragada et al. (2005) for a discussion on the collapse at Cancun.
5 The closure rules are the set of assumptions specified in the model in order 
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II. Trade Policy Analysis
The socio-economic impacts of trade liberalization are usually deeper 
than often presumed. One is faced with various difficult questions that 
have multiple and inter-related answers.6 Even after a plethora of quan- 
titative research, one is unable to find an answer based on consensus. 
For a detailed review of these issues see Winters et al. (2004), Krueger 
(1995), and Rodrick (1999). 
A. Trade, Growth, and Welfare
Before opening up the trade regimes, governments need to put in 
place investment-inducing competition and regulatory policies, safeguard 
measures and a mechanism for resolving issues such as the anti- 
dumping and production subsidies (see Bhagwati et al. 1996). The 
effects of free trade on the population of a country (particularly the 
poor class) will amongst other things depend upon whether they are 
net consumers or producers (of a good being liberalized). If on the 
production side free trade leads to efficiency, then this can in turn 
bring about greater specialization. The enhanced specialization can lead 
to a decrease in production costs which in turn reduces domestic prices. 
If there is domestic demand for the good produced by the poor, then 
they gain in the form of increased earning opportunities as well as in- 
creased consumption. In the case where these goods are exported, then 
the first round gain will go to the final sellers in the form of profits, how- 
ever, the second round effects will impact the welfare in general. See 
Bouët (2006) for a discussion on what the poor may expect from trade 
to ensure equilibrium. 
6 Some questions highlighted in the literature include: what are the pre- 
requisites for moving towards free trade? Will trade-led economic growth lead to 
poverty reduction and redistribution of wealth? Should the government have 
targeted intervention to safeguard the losers? The government itself is loosing 
revenue when tariff comes down. Should it bridge the gap by increasing direct 
or indirect taxes? What happens when imports become cheaper? Are the bene- 
fits transferred to the consumers (in the form of reduced prices)? Do the domes- 
tic producers gain from the cheaper raw material imports and inputs such as 
oil and petroleum products? What will be the impact on overall employment and 
child labor? Would there be an exchange rate adjustment? Will agriculture 
sector, the main stake of poverty ridden population benefit from increased open- 
ness? What will be the social benefits of increased trade? Will technology 
transfer take place? Finally who is the net gainer from the price and quantity 
effects of trade liberalization?
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liberalization. See also Wood (1995), Bhagwati et al. (2002).
The trade structure in low-income countries is heavily dependent 
upon a low value commodity base (e.g., textile in the case of Pakistan). 
This then brings in the risk and uncertainty considerations in the 
overall analysis, i.e., the benefits of trade liberalization may not be fully 
realized if this particular commodity is subject to unfavourable price/ 
supply shocks in the international market. Hence the logic for diver- 
sifying exports and at the same time improving their quality. The in- 
creased and less expensive inflow of goods can harness technology- 
adoption practices, where the medium and long term benefits can be 
reaped from technology transfer. There may also be a structural change 
in the factor market, when more units of labour and capital are required 
in the relatively higher paid sectors producing products that have a 
dynamic global demand. See Shafaeddin (2005) for a detailed analysis.
The benefits from trade can significantly alter the social structures. 
For example, the increased household income may act as a protection 
from child labour and eventually increasing the school enrolment rates, 
which in turn could add to the future local and national productivity. 
The increased employment of women may help in narrowing the gender 
gap. As the range of imported goods increases, new skills and traits 
will follow. This is particularly true for productive sectors. Many devel- 
oping economies are already benefiting from reverse-engineering. See 
Jacob and Meister (2005), and Krugman (1995).
The advantages of a liberalized trading environment also rest heavily 
on the institutional developments in the country. The government needs 
to focus on: a) optimal resource allocation, b) design an incentive and 
safeguard structure, where experimentation and innovation could be 
encouraged, c) business friendly regulations, d) lean but efficient bu- 
reaucracy, and e) integrating the poor in the policy making environment. 
Economic governance is an issue that may be a long term process of 
reform, however, if the excessive rent-seeking behaviour is not curbed 
the potential of economic and social gains may be minimal. Foreign di- 
rect investment gets repelled from a country; where protection of assets 
and profits is not guaranteed, there are delays in litigation and arbitra- 
tion procedures, restrictive labour practices, weak land regulations, prop- 
erty rights not defined, weak transport and communication infrastruc- 
ture. See Kydd et al. (2002).
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B. Quantifying Trade Policies
A variety of quantitative models have been used for the analysis of 
trade policies. There is a vast literature on how economists have used 
these models for studying the growth and welfare impacts of trade. 
Econometric models have been constructed and used for ex post anal- 
ysis of trade liberalization. On the other hand, CGE and partial equilib- 
rium models have been used for ex ante analysis (for national as well 
as global trade modeling). See McKibbin (1996) for a comparative anal- 
ysis of modeling approaches. The commonly used gravity models are 
econometric in nature and try to capture: a) the positive relation be- 
tween the two country’s trade volumes and their size of GDP, and b) 
the inverse relation between two-country’s trade volume and their trade 
costs (see Anderson 1979). The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
has also facilitated efforts towards standardizing practices in trade- 
focused general equilibrium modeling (see Hertel 1999). For details on 
CGE experiments in the context of the Doha development round, see 
Anderson et al. (2003, 2005), Brown et al. (2003), Cline (2004), Francois 
et al. (2003), OECD (2003), and UNCTAD (2003). For overall survey on 
modeling methods for trade policy, see Piermartini (2006), Khan (2005), 
and Cloutier et al. (2003). 
There are pros and cons associated with almost all forms of quanti- 
tative models. The partial equilibrium models regardless of their size 
ignore the inter-sectoral interactions. Similarly, large-scale macroecono- 
metric models based mainly on the Keynesian tradition ignore the gen- 
eral equilibrium effects. These models are, in fact, at times referred to 
as the demand-side disequilibrium models. The CGE models, on the 
contrary, are widely used in the trade policy assessment and evalua- 
tion but even these models have been criticized due to the specification 
issues as these models use fixed production and technology coefficients 
and most of the parameters are conventionally derived from a base-year 
social accounting matrix (SAM) where the results also depend heavily 
on the choice of the base-year itself.7 For discussion on the functional 
forms used in CGE models, see Pauw (2003), Willenbockel (2002), Annabi 
et al. (2006), and Bohringer et al. (2004). 
The removal or reduction in import tariff in a small country (such as 
Pakistan) can bring about several interrelated results, namely: a) the 
7 Some years show extraordinary boom/bust conditions. The usual conven- 
tion is to choose a year that exhibits the (average) medium-term performance of 
the economy.
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domestic price of the imported good decreases by the amount of the 
tariff for producers and consumers, b) domestic production of the im- 
ported good decreases, c) domestic consumption and import of the good 
under consideration increase, d) welfare level in terms of poverty and 
inequality may change, and e) the real income of the nation’s scarce 
factor declines. 
Cockburn et al. (2008) draw seven basic results from the CGE models 
constructed and used for Bangladesh, Benin, India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Senegal. The model specifications were kept similar to 
a maximum possible extent. The main lessons are: a) liberalization of 
trade increases welfare and reduces poverty marginally, b) liberalization 
of trade is pro-urban and may increase poverty in rural areas, c) in- 
dustrial output increases more than agriculture as a result of a stronger 
export response and greater input cost savings, d) relative wages in- 
crease, e) income tends to fall more in rural areas (in nominal terms), 
f ) nominal consumer prices fall more in industry8 than agriculture or 
services, and g) the effects of trade liberalization on the cost of living 
varies from country to country. In case of Pakistan, authors find that 
trade liberalization is pro-urban in terms of income and consumption. 
This is because, first in the case of incomes, the urban households 
have a greater reliance on relatively stable sources of income, whereas 
in the case of rural households the reliance is mainly on falling re- 
turns from the relatively abundant factor of production, i.e., land. Second, 
on the consumption side, rural households relatively consume more agri- 
cultural goods, whereas the main reduction in tariffs usually first im- 
pacts the industrial goods, which are consumed relatively more by the 
urban households.
III. Trade Liberalization in Pakistan
The initial efforts towards trade liberalization in Pakistan started in 
1960s. However, even until the 1980s, the imports and export restric- 
tions were high.9 The private sector was still haunted by the past ex- 
periences of nationalization. During the 1970s, Pakistan pursued a policy 
8 Global and regional economic cooperation in the industrial sector is favored 
in the recent rise in free trade agreements (FTAs) across various countries. Kim 
and Zhan (2006) study how similarities of industrial structures and regional 
trade biases can act as indicators for establishing a China-Korea-Japan FTA. 
9 For details see Guisinger and Scully (1991).
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of import substitution which in fact required high tariffs in order to 
protect the local nascent production structure. The non-tariff barriers 
were also high during this phase. Promoting pro-liberalization views, 
the caretaker government of 1993 formed a Tariff Reforms Committee 
with the objective of revamping the tariff structure of the country over 
the next three years. This initiative was one component of the overall 
reforms package aimed at deregulating, privatizing and liberalizing the 
economy along with focus on social sectors in order to sustain econo- 
mic growth for a longer term period. The prime example at that time 
was that of the East Asian economies. After initial liberalization process, 
these countries reaped multifarious economic benefits that were not only 
limited to the balance of payments but also positively impacted the 
human capital accumulation as technology transfer came in along with 
the foreign direct investment. See World Bank (1993). 
In Pakistan, some main initiatives that were immediately undertaken 
or given priority in terms of their speedy implementation were as fol- 
lows: 
∙liberalization of external payments system10
∙removal of items from the negative and restricted list of imports
∙liberalization of capital account transactions
∙initiation of privatization programme
∙opening up of sectors previously reserved for the public enterprises
∙relaxation of regulations for foreign and domestic investment
∙administered price adjustments and financial sector reforms
∙permission for residents to hold foreign currency accounts
∙improvements in the structure of public finances by introducing 
general sales tax, withholding income tax, the removal of certain 
exemptions from direct and indirect taxes and curtailing current 
expenditure by the government. 
It was, however, realized that there are certain preconditions before 
embarking on a path to liberalize the economy and promote pro- 
competition reforms. Initial conditions in the form of a sustainable fiscal 
deficit, restrained monetary expansion and price stability are important. 
These would provide an enabling environment and allow the private 
sector to take a leading role in the development process. 
The tariffs had traditionally been a major source of revenue in 
10 Also included was the initiative of reducing the maximum tariff rates.
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Pakistan.11 Apart from the tariffs, imports were also subjected to other 
forms of taxes like Iqra surcharge,12 flood relief surcharge, import 
license fee, excise duty and sales tax. The main arguments that went 
in favour of heavily taxing imports were straight from the textbook 
economics, i.e., these duties were easier to administer, the collection 
costs were low, providing protection to domestic industries against for- 
eign competition and curtailing the unnecessary import of luxury goods. 
As a consequence of these policies, Pakistan’s industrial structure re- 
mained inefficient and heavily protected. Studies have shown that the 
effective rate of protection was high to the extent that it generated a 
strong anti-export bias in resource allocation.13 
After this realization, comprehensive liberalization of tariff regime was 
pursued. By 2004-05, Pakistan had achieved considerable success in 
this area. The maximum tariff rate now stood at 25 percent. The quan- 
tum of overall trade, however, did not pick up proportionate to the de- 
crease in tariff rates. Although the tariff rates were perpetually coming 
down during the period 2000 to 2006, however, the overall trade more 
or less showed a constant growth ranging between 25 to 30 percent of 
GDP, with exports around 10 to 13 percent of GDP. This points towards 
the importance of other factors apart from tariff liberalization that are 
impediments in boosting Pakistan’s trade. See Planning Commission 
(2005). 
In the current decade, Pakistan’s trade volume as measured by the 
sum of exports and imports has remained on the rise. From 28.1 per- 
cent of GDP in 2000, it has risen up to 31.9 percent in 2007 (Figure 
1). However, a minor concern has been the falling terms of trade (ToT). 
Treating 1991 as the base year with a ToT value of 100, it is shown in 
Figure 2 that this ratio has declined from 98 percent in 2000 to 58.4 
percent in 2007. A falling terms of trade ratio will imply that the 
11 According to 1982-83 figures import duties accounted for 43 percent of 
total tax revenues.
12 Tax collected for meeting educational expenses in the budget.
13 This also implied that producers now had an incentive to operate in the 
protected industries and therefore create inefficiencies and bring about a decline 
in quality of output. Anti-export bias is defined as the situation where the 
effective rate of protection for importables exceeds the effective rate of subsidy 
for exportables. This is the definition generally used in the context of neutrality 
of trade incentives (See Bhagwati 1988, and Weiss 2005). The effective rate of 
protection (ERP) is defined as the percentage change in producer’s value-added 
as a result of taxes on trade, over the level of value-added that would have 
prevailed in the absence of those taxes.
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FIGURE 1
OVERALL TRADE (% OF GDP)
FIGURE 2
TERMS OF TRADE
country will have to pay more for its imports relative to its export 
earnings. 
Pakistan’s present day import policy focuses on: a) rationalization of 
tariff structure, b) reduction in non-tariff barriers, and c) simplification 
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of import regulations. The export policy includes: a) concessions related 
to income and sales tax, b) exemption from customs duty on imported 
intermediate inputs and capital goods, c) establishment of export pro- 
cessing zones, and d) easy access to credit facilities.
The economic theory tells us that a free trade milieu will raise eco- 
nomic efficiency, however as trade is liberalized some in the economy 
will suffer losses while others will become gainers. Pakistan’s produc- 
tion sector may gain from further liberalization in trade as intermediate 
imports in Pakistan constitute about 60 percent of Pakistan’s total im- 
ports. For ensuring national food security and to keep prices low with- 
out excessive intervention, the government has also allowed food prod- 
ucts at a low or zero tariff rates. The average tariff rate as indicated by 
Pakistan Customs Tariff 2006 is now about 15%. Pakistan is now well 
below the bound levels of WTO and the maximum tariff rate in Pakistan 
is 25 percent. This also implies that a further decrease will bring an in- 
crease in imports and domestic consumption. The overall economic growth 
and capital accumulation also depends on the quality of imports. Raw 
material and supply chain components have greater multiplier linkages, 
while consumption goods have a higher tendency to contribute towards 
chronic trade deficits until and unless there is some possibility of re- 
export. 
There have been some efforts in the recent past to study the general 
equilibrium effects of tariff reduction in Pakistan. Siddiqui and Iqbal 
(1999) using a CGE model study the impact of a reduction in tariff 
rates. The model follows the framework given in Decaluwe et al. (1996). 
Authors study the impact of a reduction in industrial sector’s tariff rate 
by 80 percent. Their findings suggest that a reduction in tariff rates 
bring a decline in domestic prices which in turn increase the real in- 
comes of the households. Apart from education, the consumption of all 
commodities has increased and the consumption of non-food group in- 
creased more than the food group.14 Another study done for Pakistan 
by Kemal (2001), suggests the worsening of income distribution as a 
result of tariff reduction. There is an indication that gap between the 
rich and the poor widens.15 Both these studies, however, use an older 
14 A revised version of this paper was submitted in 2001 and published in 
the MIMAP technical paper series No. 10.
15 The paper provides justification from Bourguignon et al. (1991) who explain 
that there are three channels that affect income distribution: first, changes in 
factor rewards directly affect household income. Second, the changes in relative 
product prices also affect household income. As the consumption expenditure is 
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SAM for Pakistan. 
IV. Data and Model
The main database for our CGE model has been derived from the 
SAM developed by Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli (2006). This SAM is disag- 
gregated enough to serve our purpose of evaluating the impacts of trade 
policy reforms. It has been constructed for the year 2001 and utilizes 
input-output table, national accounts data (2001) with information on 
output from 15 sectors, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (2001) 
for consumption disaggregation, Pakistan Rural Household Survey (2001) 
for household income disaggregation and Federal Bureau of Statistics 
(FBS) data on production, prices and trade. The disaggregated SAM in- 
cludes 34 activities with agriculture being represented by 12 activities, 
industry and services by 16 and 6 activities, respectively. Factor ac- 
counts have been disaggregated into 27 sub-types. Labour has 10 and 
land has 12 main categories provincially disaggregated into Sindh, Punjab 
and other Pakistan. Other factors of production include water, and 
capital in livestock, formal, informal and other-agro sectors.
Our model is the conventional CGE trade-focused framework in 
Ahmed and O'donoghue (2008), Bourguignon et al. (2005), and Lofgren 
et al. (2002). This model is tailored for the common specifications re- 
quired for general equilibrium modeling of a developing economy. Some 
of the important features of low-income countries included in this model 
are: a) household consumption of non-marketed commodities, b) explicit 
treatment of transaction costs for marketed commodities, and c) sepa- 
ration between production activities and commodities (in this paper there 
is no separation). The overall model specification follows the neo-classical 
structuralist tradition which is explained in Dervis et al. (1982). Prod- 
uction and consumption decisions are modelled using non linear opti- 
mality conditions, i.e., production and consumption decisions are based 
on the maximization of profits and utility respectively subject to the 
underlying budget constraints. Production technology at the top uses a 
CES specification. If the available production techniques permit the mix 
between value added and intermediate inputs to vary, then the CES 
function is preferable. The value addition has been treated as a CES 
specified at the micro/household level thus the changes in prices may lead to 
diverse effects on individual income. Finally the capital gains and losses also 
ultimately affect the income levels.
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function of primary inputs where as the overall intermediate input is a 
Leontief function of disaggregated intermediate inputs. Fixed yield coef- 
ficients determine if an activity produces one or multiple commodities. 
The aggregate revenue from an activity is then a function of the level of 
activity, yield and the producer prices of commodities. The factors of 
production are employed until the point where marginal revenue prod- 
uct of a particular factor becomes equal to its wage. Factor wages are 
allowed to vary across activities in order to correctly portray the situa- 
tion where: a) markets are segmented, b) where factors are mobile, and 
c) where both abovementioned possibilities exist. The activity specific 
wage is calculated by multiplying the wage with a distortion term. This 
term differs across activities. 
The households are receiving: a) income from the factors via enter- 
prises, and b) transfers from other institutions such as the government 
and rest of the world (RoW). The household’s income is exhausted in: 
a) consumption, b) savings, c) paying income taxes, and d) transfer 
payments to other institutions. Households are consuming two types of 
commodities that include the marketed commodities which are ac- 
counted at the market price (market price includes indirect taxes and 
transactions costs), and the home-produced commodities accounted at 
the producer prices. LES demand function is used to allocate the con- 
sumption across commodities. 
The income received by enterprises is allocated to savings, payment 
of corporate (direct) taxes and transfers. The government is receiving 
taxes at fixed ad valorem rates and has a fixed consumption. However, 
the transfer payments made by the government to the households and 
enterprises are indexed with the level of consumer price index (CPI). 
The residual from government’s income and consumption is treated as 
savings. The payments made by the RoW to domestic institutions (gov- 
ernment, households, and enterprises) and factors are treated fixed. 
The overall domestic output from all activities is allocated between do- 
mestic turnover and exports. In this case, the assumption of imperfect 
transformability between exports and domestically sold goods is estab- 
lished using a CET function. Similarly on the import side, a CES func- 
tion is used for modeling imperfect sustainability (also referred to as 
the Armington16 assumption). 
16 This is the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported sources 
of supply. A higher value for Armington implies a higher possibility of substitu- 
tion and vice versa.
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For the current account balance, we maintain a flexible exchange rate. 
In case of savings-investment closure, the savings rates of institutions 
are adjusted in a manner that generates the precise amount of savings 
to finance the investment level. Hence savings are investment driven. 
The CPI is treated as a numeraire in the model. In our simulations, we 
will experiment with two different government closures namely fixed 
and flexible government savings.
V. Results
Our findings suggest an overall positive impact of trade liberalization 
on the macroeconomic variables and the welfare level. Table 1 provides 
two scenarios for tariff reduction. In the low-case scenario, the tariff 
rate is reduced by 50 percent and in the high-case scenario, the tariff 
rate is reduced by 80 percent.17 The closures for both simulations have 
flexible government savings, fully employed but mobile labour, and fully 
employed but activity specific capital. 
Probably the most encouraging result for a country like Pakistan is 
that the export growth shows the highest increase amongst the macro- 
economic indicators. This also implies that the share of exports in over- 
all GDP is increasing. What will be the general equilibrium explanation 
of such a result? As the tariff rates are slashed, this leads to a reduc- 
tion in the domestic price level. If there is a substantial imported con- 
tent of raw material and inputs to be used in the local industry that 
caters both domestic and foreign demand then the producer price index 
also declines. This implies that producers can now produce the previous 
level of output with a lesser cost structure thus making the home coun- 
try’s exports more competitive (Table 1). 
Unlike Pakistan if the imported content in the home country’s exports 
is not substantial, we can still explain an increase in exports through 
the external balance. A decrease in tariff rates implies cheaper foreign 
goods which induce a shift from the domestic goods towards imports. 
This in turn leads to a decline in domestic production. However, under 
such a situation the balance of trade deteriorates putting a downward 
pressure on the domestic currency. A reduction in the domestic price 
level relative to the foreign price level indicates that the home country’s 
17 This reduction ranging between 50 to 80 percent was chosen in order to 
see if there are marked differences in results with respect to the choice of tariff 
rate.
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*Low-case scenario represents a 50% reduction in tariff, high-case scenario 
represents an 80% reduction in tariff (under default closures).
**GDP (fc).
TABLE 1















































*Low-case scenario represents a 50% reduction in tariff, high-case scenario 
represents an 80% reduction in tariff.
TABLE 2 
CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF GDP COMPONENTS (PERCENTAGE SHARE)
exports have now become more attractive. 
In both scenarios, private consumption and gross fixed capital for- 
mation are indicating an increase. However, the increase in government 
consumption is greater than the increase in private consumption and 
fixed investment. This can be explained by the structure of govern- 
ment’s current expenditure. One of the main components of government 
spending is the debt servicing. In case of a depreciation of exchange 
rate (shown in Table 3) the interest payments on debt and the amorti- 
zation become expensive thus pushing the government’s current expen- 
diture higher. 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS476
Closure-1** Closure-2
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*50% cut in tariff rate.
**Closure-1: flexible government savings, Closure-2: fixed government savings.
TABLE 3 
IMPORTS, INTERMEDIATE INPUTS AND EXPORTS (% CHANGE FROM BASE)*
In Table 1, the percentage change in GDP (at factor cost) by activity 
is exhibited. While all sectors show an increase, the highest increase is 
for the industrial sector followed by agriculture. This is because the 
impact of tariff reduction is more in relatively open sectors. Given the 
greater reliance of industry on imported raw material and machinery, 
this sector becomes the main beneficiary. Does tariff reduction also con- 
tributes to any change in the share of different aggregate demand com- 
ponents? Table 2 gives details of these shares. The shares increase for 
private consumption, fixed investment, government consumption and ex- 
ports, however the imports decline. A distinction between import share 
in GDP and the overall import volume needs to be kept in perspective. 
In our case, we can see that while the import volume is clearly increas- 
ing, it is the share of imports (in GDP) in percentage terms that is de- 
creasing. The decrease in the share of imports is indicating some facil- 
itation towards the narrowing of the trade deficit (improvement in net 
exports). 
Which sectors face a decline in imports? In Table 3, we see that the 
import for services sector declines. Industrial sector’s imports increase 
because of two reasons. First the price effect makes the cheaper pro- 
duction goods from abroad more attractive and secondly there will be a 
scale effect as the resources are shifted towards the comparatively more 
profitable activities. We mentioned earlier that a reduction in the import 
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bill can favourably impact the intermediate demand in some sectors. 
We can see the percentage change in intermediate inputs as a result of 
tariff reduction in Table 3. The intermediate inputs increase for agri- 
culture and industrial sectors. There is a marginal decrease in the in- 
termediate input usage in services sector (primarily in transport and 
communication sub-sectors). The increase in the intermediate input 
usage in the industrial sector may be an indication of possible move- 
ment from traditional to more value-added goods. However, we cannot 
completely justify this without having a disaggregated activity-wise in- 
dustrial structure in our model. Some of these sectoral results can be 
seen in a companion paper by Ahmed and O’Donoghue (2008). 
In the same table, we can observe the sector-wise improvement in 
exports and the effect of exchange rate depreciation. The percentage 
change in the exports is highest for agriculture sector followed by 
industry. As textile is the main area of comparative advantage for 
Pakistan, therefore it is not surprising to note an increase in both agri- 
cultural (cotton) and industrial (textile) exports. The share of textile in 
the overall exports of Pakistan remains above 60 percent. 
For our low-case scenario, we see the impact on disaggregated con- 
sumption and income under two different closure rules. In the first 
case, the government savings are flexible and in the second case, these 
savings are fixed. In both cases, the factors are mobile. A flexible gov- 
ernment savings closure clears the government account and the direct 
tax rates are fixed. Under a fixed government savings closure, there is 
either a uniform direct tax rate change for selected institutions, or scaled 
direct tax rates for selected institutions. Table 4 indicates that the im- 
pact of tariff reduction on consumption is favourable for all household 
groups except those households who are farm owners. There seems to 
be some decline in rural consumption inequality because the highest 
increase in consumption is for the households who are not farm owners. 
This group in fact represents the median in overall rural consumption. 
Those households that see an increase in consumption levels gain more 
under a fixed government savings as compared to flexible government 
savings. This is partially due to the redistributive effect. The households 
that gain under the fixed government closure are mostly out of the direct 
tax net.
On the incomes side, Table 4 shows the percentage change in non- 
government institutional income. All institutions see an increase in 
income. The highest gain is for the enterprises followed by households 
that are non-farm, non-poor. The increase is lowest for the farm owners. 
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Closure-1** Closure-2



















































*H-1: Household (farm-owner), H-2: Household (non-farm, non-poor), H-3: 
Household (non-farm poor), H-4: Household (urban non-poor), H-5: House- 
hold (urban poor), EN: Enterprises.
**Closure-1: flexible government savings, Closure-2: fixed government savings.
***F-1: unskilled labour, F-2: skilled labour, F-3: land, F-4: agri-capital, F-5: 
non-agri-capital.
TABLE 4 
50% CUT IN TARIFF－IMPACT ON CONSUMPTION AND INCOME
(% CHANGE FROM BASE)
The income level of households that are: a) non-farm poor, b) urban 
non-poor, c) urban poor, increases by almost the same rate. The change 
for all institutions remains same under both closures, however, it is 
greater only in the case of households that are urban non-poor under 
fixed government savings. The results are mixed, if one looks at the 
factor-wise disaggregation of incomes. The percentage change in factor 
income is positive for unskilled labour, skilled labour, and non- 
agricultural capital, and negative for land and agricultural capital. The 
main beneficiary seems to be those working in the tertiary and upper 
level of secondary sectors. In our analysis, the gains are lowest for 
households that are farm owners, therefore it will be pertinent to see 
the factor-wise disaggregation of incomes of farm owners. In Table 5, 
we can observe that those farm owners who are losing have their in- 











*H-1_F-1: Household (farm owner) and unskilled labour, H-1_F-4: Household 
(farm owner) and agri-capital, H-1_F-5: Household (farm owner) and non- 
agri-capital. 
**Closure-1: flexible government savings, Closure-2: fixed government savings.
***50% cut in tariff rate.
TABLE 5 
FACTOR-WISE DISAGGREGATION OF INCOMES FOR FARM OWNERS
(% CHANGE FROM BASE)
TABLE 6 




















*H-1: Household (farm-owner), H-2: Household (non-farm, non-poor), H-3: 
Household (non-farm poor), H-4: Household (urban non-poor), H-5: House- 
hold (urban poor).
**Closure-1: flexible government savings, Closure-2: fixed government savings.
***50% cut in tariff rate.
comes associated with agricultural capital. These results, in fact, com- 
pliment our findings in Table 4.
The welfare effects can be shown in terms of the equivalent variation 
(Table 6). These results seem sensitive to the government closure rules. 
While the only losers (under both closures) are those falling in the cat- 
egory of farm owners, however, we see that households who are; non- 
farm, non-poor gain less under flexible government savings and house- 
holds who are: a) non-farm poor, b) urban non-poor, and c) urban poor, 
gain less under fixed government savings. Hence the total equivalent 
18 EV＝Hicksian equivalent variation. A positive value implies a welfare im- 
provement and a negative value indicates a welfare worsening.






























































EXCHANGE RATE (PERCENTAGE CHANGE)
variation is marginally higher under the fixed closure rule. 
Finally, we need to explain the reliability and robustness of our re- 
sults. Our model captures the process of trade liberalization with a 
small country assumption. Hence the world prices of exports and im- 
ports are exogenous, and the Armington and CET elasticities (amongst 
other elasticities) play an important role in the outcome of our results. 
In the case of Armington elasticities, a lower value implies smaller change 
in the ratio of domestic to imported consumption and vice versa. For 
CET elasticity, a lower value implies a lesser level of homogeneity be- 
tween domestic and exported goods. To conduct a sensitivity analysis 
we look at the impact of a change in the values of CET on welfare 
(equivalent variation), real exchange rate, skilled and unskilled labor 
wages across different tariff cuts. Table 7 shows that the larger the 
decline in tariff rates the higher are the welfare gains, which in fact 
increase for larger values of CET. Table 8 shows the impact of changes 
in CET values on the real exchange rate across different levels of tariffs. 
We see that larger the decrease in tariff rates the greater will be the 
depreciation in the exchange rate. However, as the values of CET in- 
crease the real exchange rate shows lesser depreciation. Table 9 and 
Table 10 look at the impact on wages. For skilled and unskilled labor, 






























































WAGE: SKILLED LABOUR (PERCENTAGE CHANGE)









































*Under 50% cut in tariff.
**Equivalent Variation (Rupee Million).
TABLE 11
WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ARMINGTON ELASTICITY*
the wages increase with larger levels of tariff cuts and decline for very 
high values of CET parameter. 
Welfare effects are also sensitive to the elasticity of substitution be- 
tween domestic and foreign supply. In Table 11, we show the change 
in welfare gains as a result of changes in the Armington elasticity. 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS482
These values are for a 50 percent cut in tariff rates. As the values of 
Armington elasticity increase, the level of equivalent variation also in- 
creases but at a diminishing rate. There is an absolute (and percentage 
change) increase in equivalent variation when the elasticity is increased 
from unity to 2. However from σ A＝3 (and onwards), the increase in 
welfare gains is diminishing. For a detailed review on the sensitivity of 
results with respect to elasticity parameters under small and large 
country assumption, see Rege (2001). 
The model treats CPI as the numeraire (fixed) and domestic producer 
price index is flexible. The savings-investment closure followed the 
investment-driven savings rule where a uniform change in propensity 
to save is considered for selected institutions. In the RoW closure, the 
exchange rate is flexible and the current account balance is fixed. For 
the labour market, factors are fully employed and mobile. This assump- 
tion may be closer to reality as Pakistan faced a shortage of skilled 
labour (between the years 2003 to 2005) and the wage rates were on 
the rise. Capital is assumed to be fully employed and activity specific. 
It is rational to assume the non-substitution (immobility) of capital, 
hence the reason for treating capital activity-specific. As labour is mobile, 
therefore we observe some movement of labour across sectors. In the 
case of unskilled labour, the demand for labour increases in agricul- 
ture and industrial sectors. In the case of skilled labour, the demand 
decreases in agriculture and services activities and increases in the in- 
dustrial sector.   
This paper is concerned largely with the after-effects of a tariff re- 
duction. However, we do not suggest which approach should specifi- 
cally be used in order to cut down the tariff rates. Briefly, we can men- 
tion here that the governments have five possible choices under para- 
13 of Doha Declaration. The first is the Uruguay Round (UR) approach 
which proposes an average overall tariff reduction along with a mini- 
mum reduction per tariff line. The second is the linear method where 
the same reduction rate across the board is applied. The linear method 
can be termed as a variant of the abovementioned UR approach. How- 
ever, the linear approach is regarded superior for tackling with issues 
such as tariff peaks and tariff escalations. The third is the harmoniza- 
tion approach, also know as the Swiss formula, and proposes a higher 
rate of reduction in upper levels of tariff structure and also putting a 
ceiling on the level of tariffs. As implied by the name, this approach 
leads to a harmonization in tariffs across countries. The fourth is the 
banded approach which is a compromise between UR approach and 
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the Swiss formula, i.e., tariffs of each country to be grouped in different 
bands and that there should be three bands for developed countries 
and four for developing countries. The actual tariff reduction with in 
each band will follow the UR approach, but there will be greater re- 
duction for higher bands. The fifth is the blended approach which again 
is a compromise between the UR and Swiss methodologies, where se- 
lected tariffs would be subject to the UR type cuts, and this will also 
be an expansion of tariff rate quotas. It has been difficult for the WTO 
member countries to reach a conclusion based on consensus, especially 
for the more crucial items / categories now halting the negotiations. Most 
of these belong to the agricultural group. However, two recent efforts 
are worth mentioning here. The G-20 proposal recommends the devel- 
oping countries to follow a UR approach and developed countries to fol- 
low a blended approach. Another proposal forwarded by the Chairman 
of WTO General Council (before the Cancun meeting) also recommends 
the blended approach for developed countries, but the developing coun- 
tries can choose from two alternatives: a) banded approach with expan- 
sion of tariff rate quotas for the higher band, and b) blended approach 
without any maximum tariff condition. We cannot discuss these debates 
in detail here, however, a comprehensive summary of these proposals 
has been provided in Vlahantoni-Tikof (2005). 
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides a general equilibrium analysis of the trade liber- 
alization process in Pakistan. We study the impact of a reduction in 
overall tariff rates under different closure rules and a range of CET 
and Armington elasticities. Our findings suggest an overall positive im- 
pact of slashing tariff rates on the welfare levels. The exports in par- 
ticular benefit from the reduced prices of imported raw materials and 
related inputs. The two main components of aggregate demand namely; 
private consumption and gross fixed capital formation both show an in- 
crease. Households that see an increase in consumption levels gain 
more under fixed government savings closure as compared to a flexible 
government savings closure. All domestic non-government institutions 
see an increase in income. The highest gain is for enterprises followed 
by households that are non-farm, non-poor. The increase is, however, 
lowest for the farm owners. The income level of house-holds that are: a) 
non-farm poor, b) urban non-poor, and c) urban poor also increase. 
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The CGE model in this paper captures only the static effects that arise 
from the increased efficiency of resource allocation. It does not capture 
the dynamic effects of trade liberalization including pro-competitive ef- 
fects and capital accumulation effects. 
Trade liberalization will accrue benefits for a country if its exporting 
sectors expand and compensate for the increased imports. Tariff reforms 
need to be accompanied by domestic taxation reforms and productivity 
gains.19 In the case of the former, distortionary forms of taxation such 
as the excise duties with multiple rates should be entirely replaced 
with a uniform VAT in order to reduce inefficiencies on the production 
side. In Pakistan, there is a need to broaden the GST base. As for the 
latter, an improvement in overall productivity (i.e., the amount of output 
per unit of input) is essential in order to maintain the comparative 
advantage and preserve/increase the share in global trade.20 The qual- 
ity improvements play a greater role in the quota-free environment and 
can guarantee the benefits from the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. 
(Received 29 June 2009; Revised 19 November 2009; Accepted 21 
November 2009)
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